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2013: Constitutional Cases in Review
Sonia Lawrence*

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews the constitutional decisions released by the
Supreme Court of Canada in 2013, with an eye to both the forest and
the trees. It aims to not only indicate the specific issues taken up by the
Court and how they were resolved, but also to explore the relationships
and disconnects between the decisions and what they reveal about a
variety of relationships: relationships between current and past decisions;
between the judges and the constitutional text; between the justices of the
Court who may have different interpretations of the Constitution; and of
course between the Court and the Parliament subjected to this form of
judicial review. The resulting paper cannot be more than a snapshot,
since the sample is bracketed by somewhat arbitrary calendar dates, but it
presents a picture of a Court which may well be in the process of
entering uncharted waters — waters which are somewhat less hospitable,
if no more fraught, than those they have traversed in the past.
The Court released 74 judgments in 2013, consistent with the recent
past and only one less than last year. Of these, 11 were clearly
“constitutional” cases, the same number as last year, representing about
15 per cent of the total. Nine of the 11 cases were Charter1 cases, one
considered section 35 Aboriginal rights, and one was a division of
powers case involving the doctrines of interjurisdictional immunity and
federal paramountcy. These numbers are broadly consistent with the
Supreme Court’s recent past.2 Like last year, in only two of the Charter
*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful for the able assistance of
Osgoode 3L Nav Purewal and IL Jeanine Tang in the preparation of this draft paper, and for the
opportunity to talk with colleagues across the country in person and via technological innovations,
about these cases and all things constitutional. I am particularly indebted to my colleagues
Professors Jamie Cameron and, especially, Benjamin Berger. All errors are my own.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
See the numerical assessments in Jamie Cameron, “The McLachlin Court and the Charter
in 2012” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 15; Patrick
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cases were the claimants successful (about 22 per cent). The division of
powers claim failed, and the section 35 claim brought by the Manitoba
Métis Federation was a substantial, although not complete, success. Five
of the appeals were completely dismissed3 and one was substantially
dismissed.4 Four were allowed in part,5 and only once was the decision
of the court below entirely overturned.6
Unanimous opinions dominated the constitutional cases, coming in
seven out of 11 cases in 2013. There were multiple opinions in only four,7
and dissenting opinions in only three.8 The work of writing reasons was
relatively evenly distributed (in fact, in these constitutional cases, the
judge who authored or co-authored the most sets of reasons, whether
majority, dissent or concurrence, was Karakatsanis J., famously tagged
by The Globe and Mail in 2013 as “struggling to make an impact” 9). As
for voting blocs, the revelation that Fish and LeBel JJ. both sat for all
11 cases and signed on to the same opinions in all 11 is interesting, but in
a year where there were so many unanimous decisions in these
constitutional cases, the significance of this observation should not be

Monahan & Chanakya Sethi, “Constitutional Cases 2011: An Overview” in J. Cameron &
S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1.
3
R. v. Levkovic, [2013] S.C.J. No. 25, 2013 SCC 25, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 204 (S.C.C.), Fish J.
[hereinafter “Levkovic”]; R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.),
Cromwell J. [hereinafter “Vu”]; R. v. Chehil, [2013] S.C.J. No. 49, 2013 SCC 49, [2013] 3 S.C.R.
220 (S.C.C.), Karakatsanis J. [hereinafter “Chehil”]; R. v. MacKenzie, [2013] S.C.J. No. 50, 2013
SCC 50, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 250 (S.C.C.), Moldaver J. [hereinafter “MacKenzie”]; Divito v. Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] S.C.J. No. 47, 2013 SCC 47, [2013] 3 S.C.R.
157 (S.C.C.), Abella J. [hereinafter “Divito”].
4
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial
Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, 2013 SCC 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733 (S.C.C.), Abella and
Cromwell JJ. [hereinafter “United Food”].
5
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14,
2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C. and Karakatsanis J. [hereinafter
“Manitoba Metis”]; Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11,
2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.), Rothstein J. [hereinafter “Whatcott”] (allowed in part);
Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.),
LeBel J. [hereinafter “Quebec v. A”] (allowed in part); Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford,
[2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C. [hereinafter
“Bedford”] (partially upheld).
6
See Appendix A for a complete list of the 2013 constitutional cases.
7
Quebec v. A, supra, note 5; Manitoba Metis, supra, note 5; Divito, supra, note 3;
MacKenzie, supra, note 3.
8
Quebec v. A, id.; Manitoba Metis, id.; MacKenzie, id.
9
“A Supreme Court Justice struggles to make an impact”, Editorial, The Globe and Mail
(April 3, 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/a-supreme-courtjustice-struggles-to-make-an-impact/article10748372/>.
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overstated.10 There are other ways of looking at the way that the judges
lined up, but it is very difficult to draw conclusions based on such a small
number of cases and such a (relatively) large number of unanimous
decisions. That said, it is notable that things have not changed significantly
from reviews of the Court’s constitutional output in the recent past.
On the numbers, this was not a blockbuster year for the Supreme Court
constitutional case watchers. The Court largely upheld the courts below,
largely dismissed rights-based challenges against state law, and is making a
habit of consensus. Yet there are ways to see the constitutional year at the
Supreme Court as more eventful than the numbers suggest. After some years
of relative calm, the consensus on section 15 shattered with Quebec v. A. The
decision in Manitoba Métis illustrated other fissures, and is almost certainly
the case which has led to the Chief Justice’s recent assertions that the era of
the Charter is over and the era of reconciliation has begun. Among the less
notable cases were the potential powder keg but actual non-event that was
Levkovic, the status quo-preserving division of powers cases Marine
Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate11 and Divito, one of the few cases
with a significant split (over whether or not section 6 is engaged), albeit one
which finishes up as a concurrence.
There were momentous happenings quite apart from the cases.
The resignation of Justice Fish in August 2013, followed by the Harper
government’s October appointment of The Honourable Marc Nadon, then a
supernumerary judge of the Federal Court of Appeal, set in motion a series
of events still unfinished, events which may open a new stage in the
relationship between Canadians, their government and their highest Court.
The political, legal and constitutional mess created by this appointment was
unprecedented, shocking and even scandalous, especially for a court that
has, thus far, quite successfully negotiated the treacherous waters of
constitutional supremacy. The slow, miserable trickle of new bad news, a
daily drip of new humiliations, steadily undermined the reputation of the
Court, and actively affected the ability of the institution to fulfil its
responsibilities. Justice Nadon — already sworn in — had to be barred from
the Supreme Court building. Eventually, it became clear that the Court
would actually have to hear argument on the question of whether Justice
Nadon was qualified to sit in the upstairs chamber at 500 Wellington. The
Justices, and in particular the Chief Justice as the public face of the Court,
10
Quebec v. A, supra, note 5, Manitoba Metis, supra, note 5 (majorities); MacKenzie,
supra, note 3 (dissent); Divito, supra, note 3 (concurrence).
11
[2013] S.C.J. No. 44, 2013 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ryan Estate”].
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put on brave if somewhat peeved faces and soldiered on as a team of eight.
They continued hearing cases, and they continued to release judgments.
In September, the companion cases of Chehil and MacKenzie were
released, along with another search and seizure case, Vu.12 These cases
show the Court’s efforts to sort out the constitutional significance of very
different kinds of technologies — sniffer dogs in the first cases, smart
phones and computers in the last. Technology (cameras and websites)
also featured in the next release, a section 2(b) case arising out of a strike
at the West Edmonton Mall Casino, in which the Court struck down
Alberta’s privacy protection legislation and offered a vigorous defence of
collective bargaining regimes.13 Finally, in December, the Court offered
the decision in Bedford, arguably the most significant case of the year, a
unanimous decision striking down three sections of the Criminal Code
after a challenge by three sex workers on the basis of section 7 of the
Charter.14 The review of the cases that follows takes a chronological
approach — the cases are considered in the order in which they were
released, from January 2013 to December 2013. The cases do not get
equal treatment. Some — Ryan Estate and Divito, for instance — are
dealt with quickly. Both are interesting but ultimately either unsurprising
(Ryan Estate) or seem to be the wrong case in which to resolve the
interesting issue they raise (Divito). Others are explored in more depth,
including Bedford, Quebec v. A and Manitoba Metis, because of my
sense that they are cases which matter in terms of both the specific
doctrines and the general hints they offer about the direction of the Court.
Other articles in this volume will look at the cases in the context of
specific doctrinal areas. This article, on the other hand, considers them as
a set on their own, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional cases of 2013.
Broadly, two themes worth following emerge from these cases. The
first is the way that the notion of choice surfaces in both Quebec v. A15
(the first constitutional case of the year) and Bedford16 (the last). The
vastly different way that choice is analyzed by the majority in Quebec v. A
and the unanimous Court in Bedford highlights the pivotal role the
concept can play in Charter analysis, since choice and ideas about the
state’s role in creating equality (or the conditions of equality) are critical

12
13
14
15
16

Supra, note 3.
United Food, supra, note 4.
Supra, note 5. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Supra, note 5.
Supra, note 5.
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points in a rights analysis that can seem fixed on the protection of
individual freedom from state coercion.
The second and related theme is the always relevant question of the
relationship between courts and legislature, in particular, the question of
deference to the decisions of the legislature.17 Despite the media
narrative, especially in early 2014, framing a court at war with the
government and Prime Minister of the day, few of these cases challenge
the government in a serious way. Even the striking down of the Act
challenged in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United
Food and Commercial Workers, Local 40118 was done in such a way as
to respect the role of the government in crafting law and policy. The
number of cases in which claimants lost, a list which includes Ryan
Estate19 and Divito,20 is long. I would read many of last year’s cases as
relatively deferential, which leads me to ask, where are the (small c)
citizens in the dominant media narrative of Court versus Parliament?
Why is the Court’s non-championing of constitutional claimants not a
similar kind of news? One answer is that these cases tend to maintain the
status quo (although this would not apply, for instance, to the cases from
early 2014 such as Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 621 or
Reference re Senate Reform22) and so may seem less newsworthy.
Another may be about the doctrinal strength of the arguments, of course,
and a third would point to the rules of leave to appeal and right to appeal
to the Supreme Court, which require the Court to hear a large number of
appeals from criminal convictions which are, arguably, neither
doctrinally strong nor of particular importance or interest. That all these
possibilities exist, though, means that Supreme Court watchers should be
cautious about supporting a narrative framing that posits a fundamentally
conflictual relationship between the Court and the government.
Cherrypicking cases to support that view not only distorts the record

17
I am interested here in deference writ large, deference that might emerge in a number of
places, for instance, in setting the scope of the case, in delineating the nature of the rights under the
Charter, in applying the Oakes test (R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.))
(which is the zone of a very particular set of deference questions), and in working through the
appropriate remedy where one is called for. As such, I am interested in more than just what the Court
explicitly describes as deference — or its opposite.
18
[2013] S.C.J. No. 62, 2013 SCC 62 (S.C.C.).
19
Supra, note 11.
20
Supra, note 3.
21
[2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nadon”].
22
[2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Senate Reference”].
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looking backward, but, because of the way it influences all the players,
may shift the course going forward.
It is possible to mine some of this year’s cases, in particular Quebec v.
A and Manitoba Metis Federation, for hints about how the Court chooses
when to unleash the power it holds by virtue of its role as interpreter of the
Constitution — and when it decides it is better muffled. Given the events
of early 2014, with the release of the Nadon decision and the Senate
Reference, the question of when and how the Court assesses the constant
need to maintain its power and legitimacy in the eyes of the governments
of the day and the Canadian public bears additional attention. The review
that follows focuses somewhat on Quebec v. A, Manitoba Metis and
Bedford, as well as Whatcott. The other nine cases get a shorter treatment,
not because they are doctrinally unimportant, but because the lessons they
offer seem more doctrinally confined to a relatively narrow area of the law
and are most useful in the context of that field (for instance, United Food23
contains strong language about the value of collective bargaining regimes
and freedom of expression, but the constitutional problem raised in that
case is relatively cut and dried). This approach is possible in part because
of the work of other authors who analyze the cases in their doctrinal
contexts, in this volume, in past volumes, and elsewhere.

II. THE CASES, FROM JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2013
1. Section 15(1): Quebec (Attorney General) v. A
The first constitutional case of 2013 foreshadowed the coming year in a
number of ways, but was also a significant anomaly. To take the anomaly
first, the case produced four judgments, fracturing the Court in a way that
was not repeated in any other constitutional case this year, and harks back to
much earlier section 15 cases, most notably the trilogy of 1995.24 Less
uniquely, the Charter claimant lost, which, given that this was a section 15
claim, is even less surprising. Like Bedford,25 which formed the other
bookend on the 2013 Charter cases, this case had more than enough in it to
interest the media. A family law dispute between one of Quebec’s most

23

Supra, note 4.
Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.); Miron v. Trudel,
[1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.); Thibaudeau v. M.N.R., [1995] S.C.J. No. 42,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.).
25
Supra, note 5.
24
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high-profile couples, an immigrant from Brazil and the Québécois self-made
billionaire she met on a beach when she was 17. The case, despite the
anonymity of the style of cause, was made for public consumption.26
A’s claim was a section 15 challenge to the Quebec Civil Code’s
exclusion of de facto spouses from spousal support and property
division.27 Five judges found that this was a violation, in three sets of
reasons,28 while three agreed with LeBel J. that there was no violation.29
At section 1, the fracture deepened, with McLachlin C.J.C. finding
justification, Abella J. finding for the claimant, Deschamps, Cromwell,
and Karakatsanis JJ. finding one of the provisions (property division)
justified, and the others, of course, avoiding the section 1 analysis
altogether.
The splits do not follow any particular easy-to-discern patterns.
While all of the women found a violation, there was substantial
disagreement among them at section 1. And, while two of the Quebec
judges found no violation, the other found at least one unjustified
violation. Another feature of the judgment is the way that the position of
the Chief Justice, which moves from a finding that the section 15 claim is
made out to a finding that the violation is justified at section 1, ultimately
decides the outcome.
What it all boils down to is a loss for the litigant. It seems unlikely
that Abella J.’s majority decision on section 15, which shifts the
discrimination analysis from a focus on attitudes, prejudices and
stereotypes to a focus on effects and adverse differential impact,30 heralds
a new era for section 15.31 The judges who agreed with LeBel J. took the
position that the regime in the Code Civil was designed to respect the
free will not only of B, but of A herself. The Chief Justice’s section 15
concurring reasons do not take Abella J.’s approach to clearing out the
detritus of the stereotypes and prejudiced language (although the Chief
Justice does claim to be in concert with Abella J.). The Chief Justice uses
26
Quebec v. A, supra, note 5. The case in fact has a nickname, but after some helpful
conversations with Professor Margot Young (UBC) and the other members of the online roundtable
(see infra, note 40) on the meaning behind that nickname, I will avoid it.
27
Civil Code of Québec, CCQ-1991, c. 64, arts. 401-585.
28
(1) Justice Abella; (2) McLachlin C.J.C.; and (3) Deschamps, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.
29
Justices Fish, Rothstein and Moldaver.
30
Quebec v. A, supra, note 5, at para. 332.
31
For a more complete treatment of this case, see Bruce Ryder, “The Strange Double Life
of Canadian Equality Rights” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. (2013) 63 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 261; see also Robert Leckey, “Developments in Family Law: The 2012-2013 Term” (2014) 64
S.C.L.R. (2d) 241.
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that language, and the language from Law32 of correspondence and
reasonable rights holders, to make her point. The third set of reasons
finding a violation, from Deschamps, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.,
points to the historical disadvantage perpetuated by the rule in arguing
that the violation has occurred even though there was no intent to
stigmatize the unmarried. Thus only Abella J. saw this case as a vehicle
to repairing perceived problems in the section 15 analysis the Court has
been using.
At section 1, the positions shift or harden. Justice Abella finds that
the violation of section 15 fails both minimal impairment and
proportionality under Oakes, whereas the Chief Justice offers a deeply
deferential analysis to the Quebec legislature and finds the exclusion
fully justified. Taking a mixed approach, the third group of judges finds
that the exclusion of de facto spouses from property division is fully
justified, but that the exclusion from spousal support fails at minimal
impairment, since it fails to minimally impair the rights of the vulnerable
person in a relationship of financial interdependence, a person for whom
the “choice” to marry did not really exist.33
It is a relief to see both Abella J. and the set of three concurring
judges addressing directly the question of choice as it applies to
marriage. The notion that marriage is a choice has always seemed odd,
since of course marriage represents an agreement to marry. Not-marriage,
however, may represent a mutual decision to not-marry, or it might, as
the evidence suggests it did here, represent one party’s refusal to marry
and the other’s wish to marry. In such a situation, one of the two
“choices” is validated: the choice to “not-marry”.34 The suggestion that
the Quebec legislature might have considered a scheme in which couples
could agree to opt out of support and property obligations as a way of
respecting autonomy (of which so much is made in this decision) while
respecting the interests of the vulnerable spouse in a relationship of
interdependence, is enthusiastically made by Abella J. but derided by the
Chief Justice because it would not serve the goals of the Quebec
legislature, namely “maximizing choice and autonomy for couples in

32
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.).
33
Quebec v. A, supra, note 5, at para. 360.
34
Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60,
2004 SCC 65, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.), Binnie J.; Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh,
[2002] S.C.J. No. 84, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 (S.C.C.), Bastarache J.
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Quebec”.35 As she did in Hutterian Brethren, the Chief Justice takes an
approach at minimal impairment that refuses to consider any outcome
other than the one “the legislature seeks to achieve”.36 In this case, that
goal is achieved by keeping the state out altogether. It would not be
achieved in a scheme that required couples to agree and take positive
action.37 There is a benefit in being free to choose whether one wants a
relationship which offers no rights, and imposes no obligations.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach to section 1 strikes a discordant
note when compared with her decision at section 15. Remember when
we used to be able to say that decisions found to be discriminatory at
section 15 will rarely be found justified through the section 1 analysis?38
The considerations which informed that statement are nowhere in
evidence in the Chief Justice’s reasons. The minimal impairment
approach used by the Chief Justice offers significant deference to the
government goal that resulted in the discrimination.39 Finally, the Chief
Justice’s approach to the question at section 1 seems to read out —
entirely — the context in which these decisions are made, a context in
which the financial imbalances between spouses are heavily gendered.
Hester Lessard describes the reasons of LeBel J. as illustrating how
“choice language” serves as “‘ideological glue’ ... binding the twin pillars
of classical liberalism — formal equality and negative liberty — to a
conception of conjugality and property rights rooted in a conservative
and patriarchal tradition”.40 The Chief Justice’s description of this
scheme as one that avoids paternalism, given the many arguments that it
supports patriarchy, is one which may prove helpful in sketching her
ideological commitments to gender equality on the one hand and a kind
of libertarianism on the other.

35

Quebec v. A, supra, note 5, at para. 379 (per Abella J.) and at para. 442 (per McLachlin

C.J.C.).
36
Id.; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, 2009 SCC 37,
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 54 (S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C. [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”].
37
Quebec v. A, supra, note 5, at para. 443.
38
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143,
34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, at para. 28 (S.C.C.), Wilson J.
39
Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 36; Benjamin L. Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional
Reasoning and Cultural Difference: Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of
Wilson Colony” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 25.
40
Hester Lessard, “Eric & Lola Roundtable: Hester Lessard – Knotted & Glued”, online:
(2013) The Institute for Female Legal Studies at Osgoode <http://ifls.osgoode.yorku.ca/2013/05/ericlola-roundtable-hester-lessard-knotted-glued/>.
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Commentators have noted that the various articulations of the
Quebec legislature’s goal in excluding de facto spouses are perhaps at
odds with the reality. In particular, McGill’s Robert Leckey argues that
looking at the provisions in their broader context reveals the way that
public law in Quebec does treat cohabitants as mutually supporting. It is
only in the private law context that we see this concern for validating the
autonomy of unmarried couples.41 At this point, the relevance of the issue
that came into sharp focus over the appointment of Justice Nadon much
later in the year surfaces — this is a Quebec case, and most of the
reasons in this case are freighted with references to Quebec
particularities. Both the long history set out by LeBel J. in his section 15
analysis, and the federalism-inflected deference of the Chief Justice’s
section 1 approach indicate that it was Quebec specificities that drove all
the judges who denied the claim, although at different points in the
analysis. It will almost certainly prove difficult to extract a general rule
about section 15 from this case, where judges claim to agree when they
seem to disagree, where disagreements are so fundamental, where the
validity of choice as a concept is so deeply contested, where the question
of Quebec looms in ways acknowledged and not, and where the deeply
gendered context of economic dependency post relationship breakdown
is left largely unexplored. Nothing new for section 15, but this is not a
decision that helps with strategic choices in litigation. Once again we will
be waiting for a brave — or foolhardy — claimant in order to get another
chance at understanding the Supreme Court’s approach to section 15.
2. Section 2(a): Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v.
Whatcott
Whatcott,42 a challenge to the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code,43
brought together religious freedom, homophobia, freedom of speech, and
Human Rights Codes — issues often gathered under the rubric of “clash
of rights”.44 This clash, usually between religious and equality rights, has
41
Robert Leckey, “Eric & Lola Roundtable: Robert Leckey responds on choice”, online:
(2013) The Institute for Female Legal Studies at Osgoode <http://ifls.osgoode.yorku.ca/2013/05/ericlola-roundtable-robert-leckey-responds-on-choice/>.
42
Supra, note 5.
43
S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1.
44
For more focused treatment of Whatcott, see Mark J. Freiman, “Hate Speech and the
Reasonable Supreme Court of Canada” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. (2014) 63
S.C.L.R. (2d) 295.
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become a standard media trope, but the challenge of understanding the
ways in which the two rights co-exist is also reflected in two major
issues that bubbled up and festered in 2013: the Parti Québécois’
proposed “Charter of Values”,45 and the efforts of Trinity Western
University,46 a private Christian evangelical institution in Kamloops,
British Columbia, to establish a law school that would operate under a code
of conduct banning homosexual activity by all students, faculty and staff.
The decision in Whatcott captures two ongoing controversies in
political spheres. The first is a debate over the utility and legitimacy of
human rights commissions, and the second is increasing fear and
fascination about religion versus equality controversies among the
Canadian public. However, the release of the decision in Whatcott early
in the year may have served to diffuse rather than fan the flames of both
of these disputes, since it does little more than confirm the position that
Canadian courts have taken on hate speech in R. v. Keegstra47 and Ross v.
New Brunswick School District No. 1548 in the 1990s.49
Whatcott’s homophobic flyers were distributed by hand to homes in
Regina and Saskatoon, and complaints were filed with the Saskatchewan
Human Rights Commission. The Tribunal held that the flyers contravened
section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, which prohibits
material that “exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles
or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons
on the basis of a prohibited ground”. The Tribunal further held that
section 14(1)(b) constituted a reasonable limit on Whatcott’s section 2(a)
and 2(b) rights under the Charter. The Supreme Court upheld these parts
of the Tribunal’s ruling in a unanimous, 207-paragraph decision written
by Rothstein J.50

45
Richard Bourhis, “Quebec’s Charter remains a solution in search of a problem”, The Globe
and Mail (January 14, 2014), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/quebecs-charterremains-a-solution-in-search-of-a-problem/article16310595/>.
46
Cristin Schmitz, “Lawyers in Ontario reject TWU approval”, The Lawyers Weekly (May 9,
2014), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=2133>.
47
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.), Dickson C.J.C.
[hereinafter “Keegstra”].
48
[1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 171 N.B.R. (2d) 321, La Forest J. [hereinafter
“Ross”].
49
See, for instance, the arguments made in Cara Faith Zwibel, “Reconciling Rights: The
Whatcott Case as Missed Opportunity” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. (2014) 63
S.C.L.R. (2d) 313.
50
The Tribunal found that all four of the flyers violated s. 14 of the Saskatchewan Human
Rights Code. The Supreme Court upheld two of those findings but found the other two unreasonable.
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The decision begins by setting out the test for hate speech, an
objective test that focuses on the effect of such expression on the
audience and the objective of preventing discrimination, a test which
requires that the material in question reach the “extreme” end of the
spectrum of hatred. Under this approach, it is clear that section 14(1)(b)
does constitute an infringement on the right to freedom of expression. At
section 1, the portion of section 14(1)(b) after the word “hatred” —
“ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity” — was found to fail
the rational connection test because it simply could not be reconciled
with the test for hate speech. This rather rare rational connection failure
comes as no surprise to most followers of human rights regulations and
section 2(b), and the remainder of the section has a smooth passage
through the minimal impairment and proportionality parts of the Oakes
test. The final balancing in particular took the approach of earlier cases in
describing hate speech as a degraded form of speech in terms of the
purpose of section 2(b) protections. Political speech it may be, but in
being restrictive and exclusionary, it is speech that aims to shut down
dialogue rather than promote it. Thus section 14 aims to protect vital
political discourse against marginal forms of expression that harm the
values that section 2(b) sets out to protect.
Whatcott had argued that the provision was overbroad on a number
of other grounds. One of these arguments engaged the distinction
between sexual acts and sexual orientation. The Court’s approach was
not to deny the distinction, but rather to focus on the clear effect of hate
speech about behaviours that are associated with — and often only with
— a group defined by sexual orientation. Another overbreadth argument
pointed to the lack of any intent requirement in the Code. The Court
again took an approach that avoided sweeping pronouncements in favour
of describing the goals of the government in passing the Code in a
nuanced, careful way. The Court held that truthful statements could be
hate speech, even when they are stated in ways that did not intend to
harm, but also that there is no constitutional requirement on the part of
the legislature to allow such speech, especially when to do so would in a
great many cases “gut the prohibition of effectiveness”.51 The legislature
is still, says the Whatcott decision, entitled to protect vulnerable groups
via minimal infringements of freedom of expression.

51

Whatcott, supra, note 5, at para. 143.
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The section 2(a) question, which raised issues with less of a history
at the Supreme Court, was somewhat anticlimactically dealt with in
12 paragraphs. While the Court agreed that the speech in question did
engage section 2(a) protection (the Commission had argued that it should
not), the section 1 analysis that followed closely tracked that applied in
the expression claim. That is, the prohibition captures only hate speech.
It does not, therefore, capture all “preaching” against homosexuality,
only forms of expression that constitute hate speech.52 One single
paragraph suffices to sever the language of “ridicules, belittles or
otherwise affronts the dignity of …”, already lost in the section 2(b)
claim in any event, and to declare that section 14(1)(b) is a reasonable
limit on section 2(a).53 The remainder of the case addresses the
application of section 14(1)(b) by the Tribunal in Whatcott’s case, a nonconstitutional issue that I will not cover here.
Twenty-one interveners participated in this case. Only two of these
were Attorneys General (Saskatchewan and Alberta). Four were Human
Rights Commissions (Canada, Alberta, Ontario, Northwest Territories
and Yukon together). The remainder included a Bar Association, faith
groups, and groups representing women, African Canadians, sexual
minorities, women, Indigenous people and journalists. It is these
21 interveners, not the decision in this case, that indicates the importance
of this issue to both sides, and the extent to which the case was widely
understood to be at least as much, if not more, about religious freedom
than freedom of expression. Whatcott indicates that the Supreme Court
has no particular interest in moving away from approaches to hate speech
that have, in many ways, served to highlight the difference between the
Canadian Charter and approaches to freedom of speech in the United
States. This seems likely to be tested repeatedly both in the Supreme
Court and in the court of public opinion over the next few years.
3. Aboriginal Rights: Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General)
Over the past year, the current Chief Justice has at least twice
suggested that the era of the Charter is, if not ending, then at least being
eclipsed by a new and pressing constitutional challenge, that of section 35

52
53

Id., at para. 163.
Id., at para. 164.
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Aboriginal rights and reconciliation.54 The implication that our
relationship with the Charter is approaching maturity is an intriguing
one. But the change she sees is not reflected in the caseload of the
highest Court.55 The only case which raised constitutional section 35
rights this year was Manitoba Metis Federation,56 and this decision is
thus in some ways best evidence we have with which to investigate the
Chief Justice’s assertion that conceptualizing and operationalizing
reconciliation between pre-existing Aboriginal societies and the assertion
of Canadian sovereignty will supersede the definition and protection of
Charter rights in the future work of the Supreme Court.57 The chronology
and public statements of McLachlin C.J.C. support the inference that
confronting the less than honourable behaviours of the founders of the
nation as revealed in this case was critical in developing her view that
reconciliation would increasingly define the work of the Supreme Court.
This case has its origins, like all section 35 cases, long ago. The
Métis claimed that the federal government failed to fulfil its fiduciary
duty in dealing with promises made to the Métis of Manitoba. The case is
constitutional in two ways. First, a constitutional document, the
Manitoba Act, 1870,58 is the basis for the claim. Sections 31 and 32 of
that Act, passed after the Red River Rebellion, set out promises to
distribute land to Métis children and to recognize existing landholdings.
Second, the majority decision (McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel, Fish,
Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ., with Rothstein and Moldaver JJ.
dissenting) recognizes a failure to act in accordance with the honour of
the Crown, a concept that is engaged by section 35.
The claim made by the Manitoba Metis Federation raised the
question of the honour of the Crown, alleged a breach of fiduciary duty,
54
Joseph Brean, “‘Reconciliation’ with First Nations, not the Charter of Rights & Freedoms, will
define the Supreme Court in coming years, Chief Justice says”, National Post (March 13, 2014) online:
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/03/13/reconciliation-with-first-nations-not-the-charter-of-rightsfreedoms-will-define-the-supreme-court-in-coming-years-chief-justice-says/>; Beverley McLachlin,
“Defining Moments: The Canadian Constitution” Supreme Court of Canada (February 5, 2013), online:
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2013-02-05-eng.aspx>.
55
I do not mean to suggest that she is wrong, merely that what she is describing is not a
quantitative claim, at least in terms of appellate case law. There are a variety of reasons, including the
efforts of courts to push section 35 and other disputes between First Nations and the Crown into negotiation
and hence out of courtrooms, the rules for “as of right” appeals which bump up the number of
Charter/criminal cases heard by the Court, and many others, which help explain the breakdown of
constitutional cases in terms of numbers.
56
Supra, note 5.
57
Id.
58
S.C. 1870, c. 3 [reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 8].
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asked for declarations on both those points, argued that the Federation
should be granted public interest standing, and asserted that limitations
and the doctrine of laches should not apply to this claim. These claims
had no success either at trial or at the appellate level.
The majority granted the Federation public interest standing, issued a
declaration that Canada “failed to implement the land grant provision set
out in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 in accordance with the honour of
the Crown”,59 and found that neither the law of limitations nor the doctrine
of laches could bar the Métis claims. Rejected were the claims based on
breach of fiduciary duty and on section 32 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.
The case was heard in the last month of 2011 and was not released
until March 2013,60 but it begins, as the majority writes, in some time
period before the 17th century.61 Paragraphs 20 through 31 (at least) read
almost like a script treatment, conjuring up a vision of the land as it was
then and the changes which swept over it as 1870 approached. The facts
of this case are the history of Canada before it was Canada — as it was
increasingly asserted to be “Canada”.
The crux of the claims that found success in this appeal are the errors
and delays created by the Canadian government’s efforts to implement
the promise in section 31 of the Manitoba Act to distribute 1.4 million
acres of land to Métis children. After 15 years, the process was over, but
in that time some children had received not land, but scrip-redeemablefor-land, Manitoba had passed legislation enabling the buying of land by
speculators, and much of the distributed land had been sold.
Some parts of Manitoba Metis are instructive with respect to the many
questions raised by the inclusion of the Métis in section 35, questions that
were answered in part by the 2003 decision in Powley.62 The Métis interest
in the lands to be distributed by sections 31 and 32 of the Manitoba Act,
1870 is not an “Aboriginal interest” in land, because the land was not held
communally and could be alienated.63 Once the land is determined to be held
as something other than an Aboriginal interest, the first attempt to establish a
fiduciary duty and then its breach has failed.64 The second attempt, to
establish a fiduciary duty on the basis of a government undertaking, also
59

Supra, note 5, at para. 154.
With the result that while Deschamps J. was present at the hearing she took no part in the
judgment since she resigned in August 2012.
61
Manitoba Metis, supra, note 5, at para. 21.
62
R. v. Powley, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43, 2003 SCC 43 (S.C.C.).
63
Manitoba Metis, supra, note 5, at para. 56.
64
Id., at para. 59.
60
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fails. But the claims that rest on the honour of the Crown, the ultimate
purpose of which is “the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal societies
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty” succeed, because the honour of the
Crown “recognizes the impact of the ‘superimposition of European laws and
customs’” on nations which were “never conquered” and “yet … became
subject to a legal system that they did not share”.65
The majority provides a primer on the honour of the Crown: its
theoretical and historical underpinning, when it is engaged, and the
duties it imposes.66 In this particular situation, the honour of the Crown is
an obligation engaged because of the placement of a promise to the Métis
of Manitoba within a constitutional document. Section 31 is described as
having a “treaty-like history and character”, containing “solemn promises”,
“legal obligations of the highest order”.67 The Crown, its honour
engaged, had a duty of “diligent, purposive fulfillment” and it failed to
meet that duty.68 The critical elements of the failure are set out in the
reasons: delay in allotments,69 the impact of delay on sales to speculators
(rather than the failure to prevent sales to speculators),70 and delay in the
issuance of scrip (demonstrating a persistent pattern of inattention).71 It
was, according to the majority, the delay and inattention, rather than the
specific practices of, for instance, allowing the sale of land, or random
allotment, that constitute the failure to meet the duty.
A final issue raised in Manitoba Metis relates to whether the
equitable doctrine of laches could bar the claim. The majority alludes to
this “rapidly evolving area of law” as a way of illustrating why these
claims should be heard now and why the notion of acquiescence
(critical to laches) is inappropriately applied to this situation:
[I]t is rather unrealistic to suggest that the Métis sat on their rights before
the courts were prepared to recognize those rights. As it is, the Métis
commenced this claim before s. 35 was entrenched in the Constitution,
and long before the honour of the Crown was elucidated in Haida
Nation. It is difficult to see how this could constitute acquiescence in
72
equity.
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Id., at paras. 66-67.
Id., at paras. 66-74.
Id., at para. 92.
Id., at paras. 94, 97.
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The sweeping language of the majority decision contrasts sharply
with the dissent of Rothstein and Moldaver JJ., who argue that the
majority decision has created a “common law constitutional obligation”
that is unpredictable,73 unclear,74 and unconstrained by limitation
periods.75 In fact, the decision of Rothstein J. appears to be suspicious or
contemptuous of the portentous phrasing and language used by the
majority, in particular, the description of the facts of the case as a “rift in
the national fabric”,76 a phrase Rothstein J. mockingly repeats no less
than four times, including twice in one paragraph. The dissenting judges
would leave the question of how to respond to our current recognition
that past behaviour of the Canadian government has been “inappropriate,
offensive or even appalling”77 to the government. Courts, according to
this view, have no role to play in “historical social policy claims”. 78 The
majority judges are gently chided for being in over their heads: “While
the resolution of historical injustice is clearly an admirable goal, the
creation of a judicial exemption from limitations periods for such claims
is not an appropriate solution.”79
The majority’s decision in this case indicates in tone as much as in
outcome the extent to which they see critical, foundational constitutional
issues where the dissent sees “historical social policy claims”. 80 How
far the majority judges will be willing to take this view, and to what
extent they will hold the current state responsible for addressing these
past actions, is what we will be watching over the next decades and
centuries.
4. Section 7 (Liberty, Vagueness): R. v. Levkovic
Levkovic81 had the potential to fire up the somewhat dormant debate
over abortion and abortion rights.82 In the end, this connection was

73

Id., at para. 161, per Rothstein J. dissenting.
Id., at para. 204.
Id., at para. 156.
76
Id., at paras. 140, 215, 228, 263 (per McLachlin C.J.C.). In addition, paras. 230 and 267
contain the phrase “national fabric”.
77
Id., at para. 264.
78
Id., at para. 265.
79
Id., at para. 267; calling the majority’s exception “virtually limitless in scope, relying, as
it does, on a social policy appeal to restore our national fabric rather than accepted legal principles”.
80
Id., at para. 265.
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resisted in the relatively short 75-paragraph judgment, and we are no
closer to a Supreme Court pronouncement on the precise contours of the
right to abortion than we were in January 1988 when the Morgentaler
decision striking down the Criminal Code provisions related to abortion
was handed down.83 Ms. Levkovic’s challenge started when the remains
of a baby were found in an apartment she had recently left. The cause of
death of the child could not be determined, nor could forensic evidence
show whether there had been a live birth (as opposed to a stillbirth or
miscarriage). Levkovic gave a statement admitting she had given birth,
but did not indicate the baby was alive at birth. She was charged under
section 243 of the Criminal Code: “Every one who in any manner
disposes of the dead body of a child, with intent to conceal the fact that
its mother has been delivered of it, whether the child died before, during
or after birth, is guilty of an indictable offence …”.84
At trial, she launched a section 7 “vagueness” challenge based on
liberty and security of the person, raising a variety of arguments. At the
Supreme Court, many of these arguments were not in play.85 What was
left was the liberty claim based in vagueness, which the Court dismissed
in reasons penned by Fish J. Where Levkovic had argued that the section
required reporting all failed pregnancies on pain of criminal prosecution,
Fish J. “solved” the problem by reading down the ambit of the statute so
that the “pre-birth” aspect would apply only to “child that has reached a
stage of development where, but for some external event or
circumstances, it would likely have been born alive.”86

82
See for instance, the commentary and controversy over the closing of New Brunswick’s
Morgentaler clinic, the only free-standing abortion clinic in that province: CBC News, “Abortion clinic’s
closure focuses debate on women’s health”, June 9, 2014, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
new-brunswick/abortion-clinic-s-closure-focuses-debate-on-women-s-health-1.2669311>; Kelly Grant,
“Outside big cities, abortion services still hard to find” The Globe and Mail, May 29 2014, online:
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/health-and-fitness/health/maritimers-show-mixed-emotions-in-lostaccess-to-abortion-services/article18902996/>. See also the media coverage and reaction to Liberal Party of
Canada Leader Justin Trudeau’s May 2014 statement that Liberal MPs must always “vote in favour of a
woman’s fundamental rights”, and subsequent clarifications. Josh Wingrove, “Future Liberal MPs must be
‘pro-choice,’ Trudeau says”, The Globe and Mail, May 7, 2014, online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/future-liberal-mps-must-be-pro-choice-trudeau-says/article18530161/>; Leslie McKinnon,
“Justin Trudeau’s abortion stance leaves Liberal ranks in confusion”, CBC News, May 21, 2014, online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/1.2648752>.
83
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
84
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 243.
85
The overbreadth arguments had failed at first instance and at the Court of Appeal and
were not raised at the Supreme Court.
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R. v. Levkovic, supra, note 3, at para. 13 (italics in original).
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This solution differed from the approach of the trial judge
(overturned by the Court of Appeal), who had severed the word “before”
from section 243, saying that it was not possible to identify a point on the
gestational spectrum when a fetus becomes “the body of a child”.87 It is
clear from the trial decision (which, for instance, contains the heading,
“The Crime of Abortion”) that the history of section 243 was a key part
of the applicant’s claim that the provision was part of a set of offences
which attempted to control reproduction, and to criminalize abortion.88
The Court of Appeal overturned the remedy of severance, arguing that
section 243 could be interpreted by reference to the Old Bailey case of
R. v. Berriman, and that case’s focus on viability or “chance of life” as
the moment at which a fetus becomes a child and thus the birth (whether
live or still) becomes subject to section 243.89
The Supreme Court found the Berriman test to be both too fixed (it
suggested seven months was an age at which a fetus was unlikely to be
born alive), and too speculative (“might have been born alive”).90 It
repaired these failings by choosing as the appropriate test the one
described above, one which asks whether it was “likely” that there would
have been a live birth.91 The claimant argued that the need for “medical
evidence” to determine whether the statute applies violated section 7
vagueness requirements because ordinary laypeople cannot ascertain
when their conduct has crossed into the territory of the criminal law.92
Pointing to the use of breathalyzers and to the occasional complications
around causation that arise in murder cases, the Court held that the need
for medical/scientific expert evidence “to help the court determine
whether the elements are made out on the facts of a particular charge”
(rather than to define the elements of the offence) is ordinary and not
grounds for finding a vagueness violation.93
In fact the outcome of Levkovic appears to break little new ground,
and the selection of the “likelihood” test as well as the decision not to
consider Levkovic’s submission that liberty and security were violated
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R. v. Levkovic, [2008] O.J. No. 3746, 235 C.C.C. (3d) 417, 178 C.R.R. (2d) 285 (Ont.
S.C.J.), per Hill J.
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See heading before para. 53 in Levkovic, id.
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R. v. Levkovic, [2010] O.J. No. 5252, 2010 ONCA 830, at para. 114 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Berriman (1854), 6 Cox C.C. 388.
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Levkovic, supra, note 3, at paras. 51, 54.
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by the requirement that women disclose the “natural end of a failed
pregnancy” made this case much less than it might have been with
respect to abortion.94 More interesting, I think, than the outcome is the
sanitization of the judgment at the Supreme Court level, the scrubbing of
the long history of the section and of any mention of “viability” and all
but one mention of the word “abortion”.95 Despite the fact that these
issues constituted the basis of Ms. Levkovic’s arguments, the Supreme
Court buries them deep. What this signals is unclear — it could be that
the Court does not believe this section can in any way interfere with the
right as set out in Morgentaler. Or, it could be a concern that the case
was not the right one in which to take up questions of the point in a
pregnancy when abortion might constitute, in some way, a crime. The
result therefore resolves Ms. Levkovic’s claim in a distinctly unsatisfying
way, revealing a host of important and interesting questions only to
awkwardly avoid them. Ms. Levkovic was sent back for a new trial.
5. Division of Powers (Interjurisdictional Immunity, Federal
Paramountcy): Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate
Ryan Estate96 is the only interjurisdictional immunity case, and the
only paramountcy case, of 2013, but it appears to add nothing to existing
doctrines. The tragedy which precipitated the case contrasts with the
tranquil recitation of existing doctrine with which it is resolved. The two
Ryan brothers died after their fishing boat capsized, and their estates
planned to sue the boat builder via the Marine Liability Act,97 although
they had already received compensation via the Workplace Health, Safety
and Compensation Act.98 Section 44 of the WHSCA eliminates rights of
action where compensation is available under the Act. The constitutional
questions raised by the meeting of the MLA and the WHSCA are
whether interjurisdictional immunity applies to render section 44 of the
WHSCA inapplicable, or whether federal paramountcy applies to render
WHSCA’s section 44 inoperable to the extent it conflicts with the MLA.
94
Id., at para. 30. Note that there were no interveners on this case other than the Attorney
General of Canada and the Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.
95
Id. See, at para. 44: “The phrase ‘before, during or after birth’ leaves no room for doubt
in this regard. Indeed the parties agree that in its application to a child that died before birth, s. 243
applies only to stillbirths ― not to miscarriages or abortions. …” (emphasis in original)
96
Supra, note 11.
97
S.C. 2001, c. 6 [hereinafter “MLA”].
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This fairly standard division of powers situation was resolved in
standard ways.99 In line with recent case law, the decision penned by
the team of Karakatsanis and LeBel JJ. made short work of the
interjurisdictional immunity claim. Citing Canadian Western Bank v.
Alberta,100 the decision notes that courts should consider interjurisdictional
immunity only in those cases where precedent might support it.101 In this
situation, Ordon Estate v. Grail102 offers the requisite support since it
placed “maritime negligence law” at the core of Parliament’s jurisdiction
over maritime law, and thus barred the use of Ontario statutes that would
have allowed claims that were not available under the Canada Shipping
Act.103
Ordon Estate, in other words, might seem to support the Ryan estates
in their claim that interjurisdictional immunity should render the
WHSCA bar on actions inapplicable. However, the decision briskly
rejects that possibility, which was accepted at the appellate level, by
holding that although maritime negligence law is indeed a “vital part” or
“core” of the federal power, it was not “impaired” by the WHSCA.
Referring to the language of McLachlin C.J.C. in Quebec (Attorney
General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn.,104 the reasons in Ryan
Estate conclude: “Although s. 44 of the WHSCA has the effect of
regulating a maritime negligence law issue, it neither alters the
uniformity of Canadian maritime law nor restricts Parliament’s ability to
determine who may possess a cause of action under the MLA.”105 The
reasons pay particular attention to the fact that decades of case law
support the application of workers’ compensation schemes to the
maritime context.106 Ordon Estate is treated as superseded by the
language in Canadian Western Bank and COPA wherein the standard for

99
There were also some questions of statutory interpretation and administrative
law/standard of review raised in this case, but those are not covered in this brief treatment. They
were resolved in favour of upholding the decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Workplace
Health, Safety and Compensation Commission.
100
[2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), Binnie and LeBel JJ.
[hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”].
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Ryan Estate, supra, note 11, at para. 49, LeBel and Karakatsanis JJ.
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[1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, 40 O.R. (3d) 639 (S.C.C.), Iacobucci and
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103
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9 [now repealed].
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interjurisdictional immunity success clearly required impairment of the
federal core and not merely some “effect”.107
The paramountcy analysis relies on a particular interpretation of the
MLA to hold that there is neither an operational conflict between the
two statutes, nor a frustration of the federal purpose via the operation of
section 44 of the WHSCA. The absence of conflict is revealed in the way
that section 6(2) of the MLA allows claims from dependants where the
deceased would have been entitled to bring an action if they had
survived. Yet, in the case of the Ryan brothers, the Court notes that had
they survived they would have received compensation through WHSCA
and thus been subject to the statutory bar on any additional compensation
in section 44 of that Act.108 The Court notes the relationship between
WHSCA and the MLA is paralleled by the relationship between other
workers compensation schemes and the MLA. Some of these schemes
are federal Acts, which allows the Court to use the modern rule of
statutory interpretation that presumes against the enactment of
inconsistent Acts to argue that in fact Parliament intended that the MLA
accommodate statutory bars in provincial Acts such as the WHSCA.109
Turning finally to the “frustration of the federal purpose” test, the
decision takes a confident tone in declaring that the MLA was designed
to permissively (“‘may’ bring an action”) open maritime negligence law
to new claimants, a purpose not frustrated by the WHSCA’s non-tortbased compensation scheme.110
The Supreme Court’s approach to other cases in which a federal
statute was permissive and a provincial statute restrictive or prohibitive,
such as Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat,111 resulted in the
invocation of paramountcy on the frustration of purpose test. But in this
case, the permissive MLA, and in particular the way section 6(2) opens
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Id., at para. 64.
Id., at para. 83; the Court notes the fundamental difference between workers’
compensation schemes and the law of tort, further bolstering the point that the reference in s. 6(2) of
the MLA to those who would have been entitled to bring a tort claim cannot apply to those who
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of the MLA also does not accommodate the statutory bars in the GECA and the MSCA. Based on the
presumption of consistency, this cannot be”.
110
Id., at para. 84.
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up the category of potential beneficiaries, is not frustrated but arguably
furthered by the provincial scheme as a whole.
In the end, this case offers little that is remarkable, except for the
economical way in which, with only 86 paragraphs, it turns all the claims
— upheld at the provincial appellate court — to dust, in a way that
solidifies recent trends protecting provincial legislation from the use of
both operability (federal paramountcy) and applicability (interjurisdictional
immunity). Looking forward to the 2014 cases, it will be interesting to
see whether this approach to interjurisdictional immunity continues in
the nervously anticipated outcome of the appeal in Tsilhqot’in Nation v.
British Columbia.112
6. Section 6(1): Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness)
The main lesson from this section 6 claim is the lack of consensus on
the scope of section 6 protections, an ongoing issue that is neither
resolved by the decision in Divito,113 nor particularly clarified. Divito
challenged the refusal of the Minister of Public Safety to approve a
request under the International Transfer of Offenders Act,114 for a
transfer to Canada to serve the remainder of the sentence imposed by the
U.S. court. While Abella J. for the majority finds section 6 is not engaged
at all, LeBel and Fish JJ. (joined by the Chief Justice and concurring in
the result) find section 6(1) violated by the ITOA’s grants of discretion to
the Minister regarding whether or not to consent to a transfer to a
Canadian institution. They then find this limit justified under section 1.
The issue, then, is really about the scope of section 6(1) and how to
interpret it. Justice Abella argues that to require the Canadian
government to administer all foreign sentences misconstrues what
section 6(1) protects, and rejects a literal reading of the “right to enter
Canada”, using international law to ground her argument.115 Since
Canada cannot, under international law, require the return of a Canadian
lawfully incarcerated by another state, the ITOA cannot be the basis for

112
[2012] B.C.J. No. 1302, 2012 BCCA 285 (B.C.C.A.), revd [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014
SCC 44 (S.C.C.). After the completion of this paper, the Supreme Court reversed: [2014] S.C.J.
No. 44, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.).
113
Supra, note 3.
114
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115
Divito, supra, note 3, at para. 39.
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such a right. However, the majority did assert that the irritatingly vague if
increasingly familiar “Charter values” would govern the exercise of
ministerial discretion. But Divito’s appeal did not raise this issue, and so
the question of how this would apply in practice was not taken up.
7. Section 8: R. v. Chehil and R. v. MacKenzie
Chehil116 and MacKenzie117 are companion cases focused on the
reasonable suspicion threshold in section 8 jurisprudence. MacKenzie
also raised a section 9 claim. In both cases, the Supreme Court majority
upheld the constitutionality of the searches and the use of the sniffer
dogs, last raised in 2008 around the “expectation of privacy” in particular
locations. In so doing, they overturned the decisions of the trial judges in
both cases.118 Each case begins with a story of law enforcement suspicion
on the basis of a supposed match between the accused and a courier
profile. In Chehil, a unanimous loss for the claimant, suspicion was
raised — via the experience of the officers involved — by the one-way
ticket purchased by the accused, the cash payment made for the ticket,
and the fact that he checked one bag.119 They used a drug detection dog
to run a line-up of 10 bags, including the appellant’s. The dog indicated
Chehil’s bag and a cooler (later found to contain no drugs). In MacKenzie,
which resulted in a 5:4 split denying the accused’s appeal, one of the two
RCMP constables who pulled over MacKenzie (he was apparently
travelling two kilometres over the posted limit) described him as “shaky
… trembling”, “sweating” and with a visibly “pulsing” carotid artery. 120
MacKenzie took asthma medication but that did not appear to help, and
the officer noted “a pinkish hue” to his eyes. To the Constable, this was
“probably some of the highest nervousness that I’ve seen in a traffic
stop”.121 MacKenzie, who had a completely clean record, was then
questioned about his trip and appeared confused on the details. Like so
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many other constables who testify in similar cases, Constable Sperlie had
attended RCMP drug “Pipeline” courses.122 Consistent with many other
cases, he offered a litany of reasons for his suspicions. In addition to the
symptoms of nervousness described above, he offered:


erratic driving (slowing down to 20 kilometres per hour under the
posted limit), “an overreaction with people that are trying to hide
something from the police”;123



pink eyes and tremors (consistent with use of cannabis);124 and



travel on a known drug pipeline (Calgary is a “well known source of
controlled drugs”, drugs go “west to east” in Western Canada).125

Faced with these facts, the Court struggles to articulate a test that can
meaningfully sift through the avalanche of common behaviours offered
by every police officer ever asked to explain a stop. How can courts, at
second hand, meaningfully assess the difference between ordinary and
expected behaviours and responses, and the packaging of multiple
behaviours and responses in a way that marks them as suspicious? The
challenge is two-fold. First, of course, they must rely on the testimony of
the officer. The nature of the items on the profile makes it quite easy to
develop a post hoc list of observations to cover intuition or prejudice (the
real cause of suspicion). More troubling is that even where the
observations are rightfully made, the only link between these behaviours
and the relevant crime (in this case drug trafficking) is one offered by
law enforcement officers. It is police experts who claim that these
behaviours cluster and mark situations of drug couriering. There is no
suggestion that empirical tests have been conducted or any suggestion
from the Court that they should be. In other words, these “profiles”,
which are widely taught, may well be completely invalid in terms of their
descriptive power.126 Police are not required to illustrate either the
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reliability or the validity of their experientially based conclusions. This
issue is not addressed by the Court in either Chehil or MacKenzie. Nor is
the question of whether drug dogs are a sophisticated detection “device”
or a convenient pretext for searches.127 Instead, these cases serve merely
to further define the reasonable suspicion analysis laid out in Kang-Brown
and A.M. in 2008. The standard for a sniff search in these kinds of
locations is possibility — not probability — a standard further justified
by the minimally intrusive nature of sniff searches.
In rejecting the appeals in both Chehil and MacKenzie, the Supreme
Court majority seems to have decided that there will be no scrutiny of the
expertise claimed by the police. In this light, the skepticism evinced by
the four dissenters in MacKenzie (and of course, by the trial judge in that
case) is welcome:
The police cannot simply draw on their experience in the field to create
broad categories of “suspicious” behaviour into which almost anyone
could fall. Such an approach risks transforming the already flexible
standard of reasonable suspicion into the “generalized” suspicion
standard … [C]ourts must not fail to hold police accountable when they
stray from the proper exercise of their power and draw broad inferences
of criminality without specific, individualized suspicion that can be
objectively assessed. The constellation of facts grounding reasonable
suspicion must be “based in the evidence, tied to the individual, and
128
capable of supporting a logical inference of criminal behavior” …

The dissent focuses on rehabilitating the decisions made by the trial
judge, and denying the assertion of the majority that the trial judge erred
in a number of ways. Constable Sperlie, who made the stop in
MacKenzie, had not in fact received significant training in detecting the
signs of drug use (as opposed to the signs of drug couriering), and yet
these featured in the development of his “reasonable suspicion”.129
But the dissent is focused on making sure that the courts are not overly
deferential to the police as police. Much less attention, relatively
speaking, is paid to the problem of how the substance of police training

127
This issue has been picked up by legal commentators, along with popular blogs and even
network television legal dramas. See “Mounting evidence drug- and bomb-sniffing dogs just props to
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programs is developed.130 Needless to say, the majority does not even
approach the question of the training. Why, in these cases, the Court
would treat the expertise of the officers as dependent on the training they
receive, when that training is not provided by institutions of higher
learning or based on randomized peer-reviewed studies with acceptable
levels of reliability and validity, but rather is provided by other police
services and based (so it appears) largely on “experiential knowledge”, is
a mystery that does not pass the sniff test.
8. Section 8: R. v. Vu
Two of 2013’s constitutional cases reflect the massive technological
change that we are living through, and the way that legislation, the
common law and constitutional law are scrambling to respond to new
realities and concerns. Both of the cases which clearly deal with new
technologies are interested in the way these technologies have an impact
on privacy. Vu131 was the first. It takes up the question of search powers,
like Chehil and MacKenzie, but rather than considering the use of an old
if sophisticated technology (sniffer dogs) in searches, Vu considers the
technological devices so many of us now live with and rely on, and the
way these devices can betray us by giving up massive amounts of
information we may not have known they held.
Vu arises out of a police investigation into a marijuana grow
operation. Searching a residence under a warrant regarding “theft of
electricity”, the police found smartphones and a computer. The
constitutional question in Vu is whether a smartphone is like a cupboard
130
MacKenzie, id., at para. 105. See also paras. 120-121, in which the dissenting reasons
take issue with some aspects of the “profile” Constable Sperlie had learned about in his “pipeline”
training:
A particular driving route, on its own, is not indicative of suspicious behaviour,
particularly when it is the primary route between two major cities. The trial judge
noted in his reasons that “[n]o evidence was offered” to support Cst. Sperlie’s
opinion that Calgary was a “known source of narcotics” and Regina a “known
destination of sale” (para. 32). Although this factor should not be completely
discarded, it will typically carry little weight.
There are other disturbing aspects of the case, most notably those canvassed by the majority at
paras. 43-52, raising the possibility that in fact what the officers were doing that day was conducting
manifestly unconstitutional random traffic stops. This possibility precisely indicates why judicial
scrutiny of profiles is so critical. To the extent that they are so general as to offer consistent cover for
prejudicially motivated or random traffic stops, they are a deliberate effort to circumvent Charter
scrutiny.
131
Supra, note 3.

30

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

in a house and so does not need any additional authorization for search,
or whether it is something different. In Vu, the warrant did not
specifically include computer. A unanimous Court recognized that the
unique, Tardis-like properties of a computer (including a smartphone),
engage unique privacy concerns in the section 8 analysis: “Computers …
compromise the ability of users to control the information that is available
about them in two ways: they create information without the users’
knowledge and they retain information that users have tried to erase.”132
Vu does not suggest that police cannot search computers. It merely
indicates that computers are a separate place for the purposes of warrants
and searches. What it will do is make a difference in the procedure they must
use to obtain the evidence — that is, they will have to either specifically
name computer and computer-like devices in the warrant, or seize the item
to preserve the information contained and seek an additional warrant to
search it.133 Given the ubiquity of computers and particularly smartphones,
the protective impact of Vu going forward will at least in part depend on the
warrant issuer. Another way to see Vu is as the tip of an iceberg of cases
which raise complicated questions about precisely how law should apply to
specific technologies. In particular, the Ontario case of R. v. Fearon raises
similar, but meaningfully different issues.134 Rather than a warranted search
of a residence, Fearon arises out of a search incident to arrest. And, rather
than a smart phone or a computer, it involves a “dumb phone”, a phone
which had extremely limited features and, in particular, was not connected to
the Internet. Still, these so-called “dumb phones” (the height of technology
about 15 years ago) can keep a list of your calls, your contacts and your
texts. Between a cupboard and a computer, we can draw a line. What about
between a cupboard and a fitbit (a device which tracks the wearer’s exertion
levels throughout the day and wirelessly updates server data)? And what of
the way in which the information held by these devices (or, more accurately,
often held on a server farm somewhere far away) is not, like traditional
forensic evidence, the result of the picking up or dropping off of trace

132
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substances, but rather is deliberately collected by private institutions? It is a
relief to see that the Court does seem ready to recognize the new privacy
concerns raised by these technologies, but the lag between the blistering
pace of technological change and the ponderous movement of legal doctrine
seems set to continue.
9. Section 2(b): Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v.
United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401
The second appearance of the technologies now ubiquitous in our
lives is in the context of a labour dispute. In this case,135 it was not the
state trying to get at the data of citizens, but rather the ways in which the
state is making efforts to preserve zones of privacy in a world where
these seem to be eroding with shocking speed. Revealed in this case,
I think, is the way in which these laws may have been hastily drafted and
passed — suggesting that in fact there are reasons to be wary of trying to
have legal reform match the speed of technological change. It may seem
at times that the rights of citizens lie on the side of privacy. But cases like
this one reveal the ways in which limits on information collection may
thwart important and constitutionally protected processes. When the
members of United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 401
struck the Palace Casino at West Edmonton Mall, their lawful strike
lasted 305 days. Both the Union and the employer began videotaping and
photographing the picket line at the entrance. The union put up signs
stating that they might post photographs of those crossing the line to
<www.casinoscabs.ca>. No photographs were posted, but complaints
were filed with the Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner under
Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act136 by a number of
individuals, including the vice-president of the casino and a member of
the public. An adjudicator, barred by statute from considering the
constitutionality of PIPA provisions, ordered the union to stop collecting
personal information in the form of recordings or photographs. On
judicial review, the trial judge found in favour of the union, as did the
Court of Appeal, which granted a constitutional exemption from the
application of PIPA to the union. There were few areas of significant
difficulty for the unanimous decision (written by Abella and Cromwell JJ.).

135
136

United Food, supra, note 4.
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That section 2(b) was engaged was conceded by the parties. The union’s
recording of the picket line and of conduct around the picket line is
expressive activity, as it aimed to persuade people to support the union.
Likewise, “potentially using or distributing recordings of persons
crossing the picketline” has an expressive purpose: “deterring people
from crossing the picketline and informing the public about the strike”.137
On the question of whether PIPA constituted a limit on these
activities, the Court was similarly untroubled. The decision notes that
PIPA is much broader than the comparable federal statute,138 and that
PIPA contains a series of exemptions that might limit its scope.139
However, none of these limitations applied to the union, which
established a section 2(b) breach.140 At section 1, the low hurdle of
pressing and substantial objective was easily passed. In the
proportionality analysis, the Court took considerable pains to illustrate
“the fundamental importance of freedom of expression in the context of
labour disputes”,141 establishing this case as the next in a line of cases
that consider expression in the context of picket lines. Starting with
R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.142 and developing considerably
through cases like U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. Kmart Canada Ltd.143 and
R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West),144 the
Supreme Court has recognized not only the expressive content of
picketing, but the unique imperatives around communication in labour
disputes. The benefits of free expression in the context of work and
labour are described in some detail in this case. For instance, expression
may “redress” or “alleviate” the imbalance between the economic power
of the employer and the “relative vulnerability of the individual worker”,
facilitate “self-understanding” and facilitate the kind of discussion and
debate that is in the broader interest of society.145 The historical meaning
of picketing and state recognition of that meaning is also canvassed, and
the Court notes that the use of the kind of pressure brought by an active
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picket “has come to be accepted as a legitimate price to pay to encourage
the parties to resolve their dispute”.146 To give up all this, in order to
allow “individuals … control over personal information that they expose
by crossing a [public] picketline” is disproportionate.147
The section 1 analysis that we are so used to seeing, the application
of the Oakes test as a piece of “judicial legislation”, is absent here, which
is almost refreshing. Instead, the Court focuses on the question of
proportionality without breaking it down into rational connection,
minimal impairment and a final balance. This approach is taken without
comment from the Court, and it does not look like a new era is dawning
in section 1. Instead, it seems that the sheer scope of the limit imposed by
PIPA renders a careful examination unnecessary.148 There are no
exemptions that would cover the activities of a union. Union expression
is important in a wide variety of ways, and, particularly on the facts of
this case, there is little to be concerned about in terms of privacy. There
is simply no way that PIPA can constitute a reasonable limit on the
section 2(b) rights.
The remedy here is the wholesale invalidation of PIPA, a remedy asked
for by both the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta and the
Attorney General of Alberta.149 Given the degree of overbreadth here, it
seems obvious that a variety of different options for “tailoring” PIPA exist,
and choosing among them is clearly not the role of the Court. The Supreme
Court decision quashed the decision of the Adjudicator, and offered no
constitutional exemption. In keeping with current practice — although not,
I think, with Supreme Court doctrine, an issue I will take up in my later
discussion of Bedford — the remedy is suspended for 12 months.150
United Food, then, is a relatively straightforward case that lends
itself to a few different readings. The technological frame suggested
above is one possibility, leading to a focus on the regimes put in place of
late in an effort to protect privacy, and the way in which these measures
may infringe some rights even as they protect others. Another frame,
obviously, would focus on the strong language the Court uses to support
the importance of, and the Charter-protected nature of, collective
146
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bargaining regimes. Finally, along with Bedford,151 this is one of only
two cases in which the Charter claimant prevailed this year, and it is
notable that all of the courts involved agreed that the Charter had been
breached and that the statute in question, PIPA, was overbroad and could
not be saved at section 1. The only change between the Alberta Court of
Appeal decision and the Supreme Court decision is in the area of remedy.
10. Section 7 (Life, Security of the Person): Canada (Attorney
General) v. Bedford
Finally, at the end of the year, with the drama of the Nadon
appointment and hearing at a fever pitch, members of the Court must
have been relieved they had the chance to unleash their decision in
Bedford right before most of the country took a break for the holidays.
Talk about changing the narrative. Despite feverish anticipation — this
was a decision that the media had no difficulty selling as a “happening”
— it is fair to say that the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision to strike
down all three of the challenged provisions of the Criminal Code152 —
caught almost everyone off-guard. This decision is remarkably concise
and focused. It never veers from a narrow point: the provisions
challenged in Bedford created dangers for sex workers. The language of
the decision was sharply critical of the role the provisions played in
increasing the vulnerability of sex workers, particularly in the context of
the murders of female sex workers from Vancouver’s Downtown East
Side that garnered significant attention across the country and in some
ways clearly primed the Court to accept the arguments made by the
litigants themselves. The federal government’s attempts to discredit the
testimony of the workers themselves and to move the spotlight to
the third parties who actually inflict the physical harm directly, all failed
to make any headway. If we had to guess which of the cases from 2013
will be seen as a critical moment from the vantage point of the future, at
this point, most of the money would be on Bedford. What it will mean,
though, is still up in the air, as we wait for the “dialogue” to play out.
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Doctrinally, the case has at least three interesting features. First, the
treatment of stare decisis in the case. The decision sets a standard for
revisiting decisions, since some of the issues raised by the Bedford
litigants were decided in Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the
Criminal Code (Man.).153
In my view, a trial judge can consider and decide arguments based on
Charter provisions that were not raised in the earlier case; this
constitutes a new legal issue. Similarly, the matter may be revisited if
new legal issues are raised as a consequence of significant
developments in the law, or if there is a change in the circumstances or
154
evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.

This solution to the question of what stare decisis on Charter claims
might mean has gained increasing importance in this third decade of the
Charter, and the test set out in Bedford (which the Court described as
“not an easy one to reach”155). By clearly holding that constitutional
rights cannot be subordinate to the common law principle of stare
decisis, this decision sets the stage for cases already in the pipeline,156
and for what might be filling the docket over the next few decades. The
question now becomes not just “what new issues might arise?” but also
“what old issues might bear reconsideration?”
Once past this threshold, the case raised, doctrinally, questions of
choice and causation. These points were raised by the federal government,
in an attempt to make an argument that the dangers and risks which formed
the core of the case were not in fact caused by the Criminal Code
provisions at issue, but by the actions of third parties — the criminal
behaviour of people who inflict physical harm on sex workers. In this case,
in contrast to Quebec v. A (which of course is set in a very different
context), we see the Court taking on facile arguments about choice in
wonderful ways.157 The Attorneys General (Ontario and Canada) take
some heat in the decision for their shared positions about the causal
connection between the law and the harms the Court is recognizing. Both
claim “choice — and not the law — is the real cause of their injury”.158
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In response, the Court presents a relatively complete picture of the
complexity of choice and sex work. It is, in many ways, this picture
which makes debates over sex work so fraught — some choose it, while
others cannot be said to do so.159
A somewhat odd bicycle analogy, stating that the government could
not prevent a cyclist from wearing a helmet and then absolve itself
because it was the cyclist’s choice to ride that created the danger, puts the
finishing touches on the Court’s response.160 This analogy seems to cabin
the scope of the Court’s interest in choice. It suggests, for instance, that
dealers of controlled substances would not be in a position to raise a
similar argument, because of the unlawful nature of the underlying
activity. But this paragraph also raises another possibility, one which
engages the choice and role not of the seller but of the buyer. That is, if
the government chooses to make the purchasing of sex illegal, in what
ways does that shift the section 7 analysis of the impact on sex workers?
It seems unlikely that the decision to make purchasing or selling per se
illegal would make a material difference to the harms and risks that seem
to drive the judgment in Bedford. Yet once the activity is illegal, does
anything change? Does everything change? This question is addressed by
Professors Hughes, MacDonnell and Pearlston in “Explaining the Appeal
of Asymmetrical Criminalization”,161 where they conclude:
In short, Bedford sends conflicting messages about the constitutionality of
Parliament’s options. Deference is owed to Parliament, and yet a violation
of constitutional rights in respect of a single claimant is sufficient to ground
a successful Charter claim. This seems to place an extremely stringent
standard on government. It also makes it very difficult to predict whether a
future Charter claim would succeed. It is almost certain that a law
criminalizing purchasers would not be overbroad. This would leave the
principles of arbitrariness and gross disproportionality. In deciding whether
a new law was grossly disproportional, the Court might be forced to choose
between its commitment to protecting individual rights claimants and
recognizing the difficulty government faces in designing a legislative
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Jula Hughes, Vanessa MacDonnell & Karen Pearlston “Explaining the appeal of asymmetrical
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scheme that is effective and yet constitutional. As we have noted, an
162
arbitrariness argument might be more promising.

The final doctrinal point this paper will make on Bedford has to do
with the remedy — or rather, the decision to suspend the remedy for a full
year. In the last three paragraphs of the case, having accepted and
described the harms that these laws cause — having raised the spectre of
serial killer Robert Pickton in that analysis — and having determined that
the provisions must be struck down, the Court addresses the question of
suspension.163 Against the interim rights violations that will result if the
decision is suspended, the Court weighs “a concerned public”. Having
earlier in the judgment noted that the provisions at issue appear to mainly
attempt to protect those who sell sex from exploitation and address public
nuisance concerns, the Chief Justice does not explain the nature of the
public concern, nor does she indicate how it meets the familiar thresholds
for suspension of declarations.164 She does not, here, describe precisely
what those “many Canadians” would be greatly concerned about. But it is
enough to justify “increased risk” to the women the Court was earlier so
concerned about, because although “[n]either alternative is without
difficulty”, the declaration of invalidity is suspended.165 It is difficult, if not
impossible, to imagine how any of these concerns might meet the tests and
concerns described in cases like Manitoba Language Rights (where the
doctrine of necessity grounds the decision to suspend the declaration)166 or
Schachter (“[w]hile delayed declarations are appropriate in some cases,
they are not a panacea for the problem of interference with the institution
of the legislature under s. 52.”).167
As I submit this paper in the early summer of 2014, there are
indications that the federal government will release new legislation
within weeks.168 The fierce struggle among the different sides of this
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amend the Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Attorney General
163

38

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

debate suggests that the introduction of draft legislation will almost
certainly mean new legal challenges. We are a long way from the “end”
of this story. The engagement of levels of government beyond the federal
also seems possible, along with the raising of new constitutional
questions beyond the Charter.169 The issues raised by this case will be
with us in law and politics and on the streets, for some time to come.

III. CONCLUSION: 2013 AS PRELUDE
The massive media focus on the Court’s relationship with the Harper
government, prompted by the release of the Senate Reference and the
Nadon decision in early 2014, suggests that 2013 will get overlooked, or
seen as a potential source of evidence and material towards untangling
the controversies of 2014. Manitoba Metis and Bedford, and perhaps
Quebec v. A, are almost self-evidently important cases, and other cases
will reveal important facets as time passes. Manitoba Metis and Bedford
are cases which are far from over and will present significant challenges
to the federal government. Bedford, in particular, has the potential to take
us into new constitutional waters, since the government seems
determined to find a way to curtail the sale of sex. When you combine
that position with the way that the current government has not hesitated
to publicly cast aspersions on the Chief Justice and by extension the
Supreme Court,170 I think that where we end up (perhaps by political
design) is on the path which leads, among other places, to the invocation
of section 33. If we are entering a new constitutional era, as the Chief
Justice has suggested, one which focuses on section 35 and
reconciliation, what will be the other features of this era? We have, for
some time now, felt relatively comfortable about section 33 and its place
in our system of constitutional supremacy. A case like Bedford, when
followed by the issues and cases which dominated the early part of 2014,

of Canada v. Bedford and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 41st Parl., 2nd Sess.,
2014 (Second reading (Senate), as of October 9, 2014).
169
Arguably, division of powers litigation has been as important a site for this struggle as the
Charter. Goldwax v. Montréal (City), [1984] S.C.J. No. 55, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Westendorp, [1983] S.C.J. No. 6, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 259 (S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C.
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should prompt us to think more about section 33. What are the political
and doctrinal features of the period from 1982 to now which led to the
relative dormancy of this clause?171 Are those features stable? When we
go beyond the purely doctrinal to delve into the question of the
appropriate roles of courts and legislatures, how these are shaped by the
Constitution and in turn how they shape the development of the modern
Canadian state, some Supreme Court cases from the past develop into
revealing markers of new trends and narratives in this ongoing
relationship.

APPENDIX A: 2013 CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AT THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
STYLE OF CAUSE

MAJORITY

Quebec (Attorney General)
v. A, [2013] S.C.J. No. 5,
2013 SCC 5 (S.C.C.)

LeBel, Fish, Rothstein,
Moldaver
Concurring in result:
McLachlin

Saskatchewan (Human
Rights Commission) v.
Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J.
No. 11, 2013 SCC 11
(S.C.C.)

Rothstein, McLachlin,
LeBel, Fish, Abella,
Cromwell

Manitoba Metis Federation
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2013] S.C.J.
No. 14, 2013 SCC 14
(S.C.C.)

McLachlin &
Karakatsanis, LeBel, Fish,
Abella, Cromwell

R. v. Levkovic, [2013]
S.C.J. No. 25, 2013 SCC 25
(S.C.C.)

Fish, McLachlin, LeBel,
Abella, Rothstein,
Cromwell, Moldaver

Marine Services
International Ltd. v. Ryan
Estate, [2013] S.C.J. No. 44,
2013 SCC 44 (S.C.C.)

LeBel & Karakatsanis,
McLachlin, Fish, Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell,
Moldaver, Wagner

DISSENT
in Result: Abella
in Part in Result:
Deschamps, Cromwell,
Karakatsanis

Rothstein, Moldaver

171
For an excellent treatment of the clause, though now very dated, see Tsvi Kahana, “The
Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from the Ignored Practice of Section
33 of the Charter” (September 2001) 44(3) Canadian Public Administration 255. More recently, see
David Snow, “Notwithstanding the Override: Path Dependence, Section 33, and the Charter” (2009)
8(1) Innovations: A Journal of Politics 1 (discussing the “demonization” of s. 33 by, among other
discourses and institutional actors, Prime Ministers).
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STYLE OF CAUSE

MAJORITY

Divito v. Canada (Public
Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), [2013]
S.C.J. No. 47, 2013 SCC
47 (S.C.C.)

Abella, Rothstein,
Cromwell, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Wagner
Concurring Reasons: LeBel
& Fish, McLachlin

R. v. MacKenzie, [2013]
S.C.J. No. 50, 2013 SCC 50
(S.C.C.)

Moldaver, Abella,
Rothstein, Karakatsanis,
Wagner

R. v. Chehil, [2013] S.C.J.
No. 49, 2013 SCC 49
(S.C.C.)

Karakatsanis, McLachlin,
LeBel, Fish, Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell,
Moldaver, Wagner

R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J.
No. 60, 2013 SCC 60
(S.C.C.)

Cromwell, McLachlin,
LeBel, Fish, Abella,
Rothstein, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Wagner

Alberta (Information and
Privacy Commissioner) v.
United Food and
Commercial Workers, Local
401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62,
2013 SCC 62 (S.C.C.)

Abella & Cromwell,
McLachlin, LeBel, Fish,
Rothstein, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Wagner

Canada (Attorney General)
v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J.
No. 72, 2013 SCC 72
(S.C.C.)

McLachlin, LeBel, Fish,
Abella, Rothstein,
Cromwell, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Wagner

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

DISSENT

LeBel, McLachlin,
Fish, Cromwell

Other cases which might be of interest:


R. v. Ryan, [2013] S.C.J. No. 3, 2013 SCC 3 (S.C.C.) (section 7
invoked but not basis for decision)



Wood v. Shaeffer, [2013] S.C.J. No. 71, 2013 SCC 71 (S.C.C.)
(section 10(b) right to counsel raised by interveners but not
considered by the Court)



Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. C. (B.),
[2013] S.C.J. No. 42, 2013 SCC 42 (S.C.C.) (part of a broader
section 23 claim, but section 23 not dispositive)



R. v. Telus, [2013] S.C.J. No. 16, 2013 SCC 16 (S.C.C.) (values
underpinning section 8 raised, but case not decided on section 8)

